Sensitivity of Coach Pay to Team Performance: Evidence From Head Coach Compensation in College Football

Jin Dong Park, Yong-Yeon Ji, Kyoung Tae Kim, Keunsu Han

Abstract: This study aims to fill the gap by examining the pay-performance sensitivity of NCAA football head coaches in the United States. Based on the NCAA head coaches’ compensation data from 2010 to 2020, we explored a) whether the base salary or bonus is contingent upon team performance, b) whether the pay-performance sensitivity differs between public and private universities, and c) whether the pay-performance sensitivity varies between power and non-power conferences. We conducted a robustness regression analysis using alternative team performance measures such as: winning percentage, ranking, and bowl game appearance. The results show that a NCAA football coaches’ bonus is significantly sensitive to the previous year’s team performance among public universities, regardless of the conference to which they belong. This finding suggests that public universities attempt to resolve the conflict of interests by adopting a performance-based compensation plan.

Keywords: Pay-performance sensitivity, college football, NCAA head coaches, performance-based compensation

Citation: Park, J. D., Ji, Y. Y., Kim, K. T., & Han, K. (2021). Sensitivity of coach pay to team performance: Evidence from head coach compensation in college football. International Journal of Sport Management, 22(4), 297-317.

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